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At a glance 
In KO (Nigeria), the Supreme Court have given an authoritative interpretation of s 19 of the 
Immigration Act 2014. This had been required because of an unusually high degree of judicial 
disagreement at the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal as to the proper interpretation of the 
removal and deportation provisions in that Act. Two different strands of interpretation emerged 
simultaneously – a weight interpretation and an exception interpretation – which the author 
explored in a previous volume of this journal. The Supreme Court have now authoritatively 
endorsed an approach to s 19, Immigration Act 2014 based on the creation in the Act of defined 
exceptions to deportation and removal. This article explains the judgment in KO (Nigeria) and 
argues that it leaves significant tensions unresolved between the legislation on deportation and 
removal on one side, and the statutory commitment to the best interest of the child on the other. 
 
Introduction 
The Immigration Act 2014 sought, through s 19, to limit judicial discretion in making decisions 
about the removal and deportation of foreign nationals from the UK when this is resisted on 
the basis of interference with the right to family and private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At first glance, the statutory scheme appeared clear. 
Although the removal of those without leave to remain, and the deportation of foreign national 
offenders is (according to the statute) generally to be considered to be in the public interest, 
this presumption would not apply in cases which fell within closely defined statutory 
exceptions. These exceptions were designed, according to the government, to codify the Article 
8 ECHR case law1 and in so doing ‘give a policy steer to the courts and tribunals’ whilst 
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limiting questions as to the proportionality of individual decisions with human rights 
obligations to the application of pre-determined rules.2 
 Despite the government having drafted s 19, Immigration Act 2014 so as to use 
structural devices which indicated the creation of exceptions to deportation and removal, and 
even used the word ‘Exception’ within the statute itself to reinforce this impression, the 
government’s lawyers argued in a series of cases before the Upper Tribunal and Court of 
Appeal for an entirely different interpretation. The government’s lawyers argued that s 19, 
Immigration Act 2014 did not – despite appearances – create a scheme of statutory exceptions, 
instead it maintained the existing mode of decision-making based on judicial balancing of the 
public interest in removal or deportation against the family or private life claims of those whose 
removal or deportation was being sought. What the Immigration Act 2014 achieved, they 
argued, was simply to place Parliament’s thumb on the scales so as to ensure that sufficient 
(i.e. lots of) weight was given to the public interest. Almost inevitably, some judges accepted 
these submissions and made their decisions on that basis, whilst others dismissed them and 
adopted a plain reading of the statutory text instead. A schism in the case law therefore emerged 
and in a review of these decisions published previously in this journal,3 I suggested that these 
disparate cases had become the ‘troublesome offspring’ of s 19, Immigration Act 2014. 
 In October 2018 the Supreme Court sought to gather up the troublesome offspring, and 
in the case of KO (Nigeria),4 impose some kind of discipline. This article is therefore about the 
judgment in KO (Nigeria). In section 1, I briefly recount the background to the Immigration 
Act 2014 and the competing and conflicting strands of case law previously identified. In section 
2, the decision in KO (Nigeria) is introduced and I explain how and why the Supreme Court 
came to adopt an interpretation of s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 that is based around 
statutory exceptions. I also examine the appeals of ‘KO’ and ‘NS’, whose individual appeals 
to the Supreme Court were dismissed as part of the KO (Nigeria) judgment, so as to identify 
what, if any, guidance is provided as to what effects of removal or deportation of a person may 
be considered to be ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unduly harsh’, and therefore qualify for relief from 
deportation under the statutory exceptions. In section 3, I lay out three unresolved tensions in 
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the KO (Nigeria) decision and in s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. All of these revolve around 
the duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children which is found in s 55 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (BCIA). I argue that the statutory scheme is in 
unresolved tension with the best interests of the child. 
 
1. Previously…: The Background to Section 19 of the Immigration Act 
2014 
Since 2010, the various Conservative and Conservative-led administrations have sought to 
implement a ‘restrictive’5 policy agenda with respect to migration. Its headline promise to 
reduce net-migration to ‘tens of thousands’ (a promise it made at Parliamentary elections in 
2010,6 2015,7 and 2017)8 has been supported by the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ of 
internal immigration checks and the denial of public and private services to those unable to 
readily evidence their immigration or nationality status.9 Access to legal redress for incorrect 
immigration decisions has also been restricted, or sought to have been restricted, by way of the 
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withdrawal of legal aid,10 increasing application fees for appealing immigration decisions,11 
and reducing the availability and effectiveness of appeals to an independent Tribunal.12 
 An additional goal of the government has been to restrict the ability of foreign nationals 
– and foreign national offenders in particular – to use their right to family life under art 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a means by which to resist deportation 
or removal from the UK. The government clearly believed that deportation law had not given 
enough attention to the public interest in deporting foreign national offenders. This was the 
central thrust of Theresa May’s Conservative Party conference speech in 2011, when she was 
still Home Secretary: 
 
We all know the stories about the Human Rights Act. The violent drug dealer who 
cannot be sent home because his daughter – for whom he pays no maintenance – 
lives here. The robber who cannot be removed because he has a girlfriend. […] 
we will change the immigration rules to ensure that the misinterpretation of 
Article Eight of the ECHR – the right to a family life – no longer prevents the 
deportation of people who shouldn’t be here. […] The meaning of Article Eight 
[ECHR] should no longer be perverted. So I will write it into our immigration 
rules that when foreign nationals are convicted of a criminal offence or breach our 
immigration laws: when they should be removed, they will be removed.13 
 
When Theresa May believed that those changes to the Immigration Rules – created in 
2012 – were being ‘ignored’14 by the courts, she resorted to statute, the Immigration Act 2014, 
in order that primary legislation: 
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…will specify that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes shall, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, be deported. Once this primary legislation has been 
enacted, it is surely inconceivable that judges in this country will maintain that it 
is they, rather than Parliament, who are entitled to decide how to balance the 
foreigner’s right to family life against our nation’s right to protect itself.15 
 
The primary legislation enacted as a consequence was the Immigration Act 2014. In s19 
of the Act (which inserted new provisions into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
(NIAA) 2002) Parliament sought to circumscribe the decisions of courts when they were asked 
to determine the art 8 ECHR appeals of foreign nationals who face removal or deportation. 
After setting out some factors which affect the weight of the public interest in removal 
decisions (ability to speak English, to be financially self-sustaining, and that their private life 
or relationship with a partner was developed whilst their immigration status was ‘precarious’ 
or absent),16 the Act provides that: 
 
117B(6) In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest 
does not require the person’s removal where— 
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a 
qualifying child, and 
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The Immigration Act 2014 further states that in the case of a foreign national offender 
who has been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment, ‘the public interest requires [the 
foreign national offender’s] deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.’17 These 
exceptions are also closely defined by statute (where ‘C’ is the foreign national offender): 
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117C(4) Exception 1 applies where— 
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life, 
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and 
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the 
country to which C is proposed to be deported. 
 
117C(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with 
a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a 
qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be 
unduly harsh.18 
  
Where the foreign national offender has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 
four years or more, statute states that ‘the public interest requires deportation unless there are 
very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.’19 
Using a well-worn principle of analysis – namely, “if it looks like a duck and talks like a 
duck, it is probably a duck” – I previously argued in this journal20 that s 19 Immigration Act 
2014 looked like it set up an exception to removal or deportation, that it talked like an 
exception, and therefore it was probably a scheme of statutory exceptions to deportation or 
removal. By this I mean that the internal structure of s 19 Immigration Act 2014 looks like it 
set up exceptions to deportation and removal because it separated out the general presumption 
that removal for the purposes of immigration control (s117B(1) NIAA) and the deportation of 
foreign national offenders (s117C(1)) is in the public interest, from rules which excluded or 
exempted certain individuals to whom that presumption was not to apply. In addition, s 19 
Immigration Act 2014 talked like it set up exceptions because it in fact described these 
exempting rules as being an ‘Exception’ (as the recitation of the relevant provisions above 
attests to). 
 The problem that arose, however, was that there followed a series of case law at the 
Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal which articulated two competing and conflicting 
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interpretations of the relevant passages of statute; which I labelled as being the ‘troublesome 
offspring’ of s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. Whereas MAB21 in the Upper Tribunal endorsed 
this ‘exception approach’ to interpreting s19 of the Immigration Act 2014, the Upper Tribunal 
in KMO22 and Court of Appeal in MM (Uganda)23 pursued a different interpretation which 
suggested that it did not alter the decision-making framework from the pre-existing art 8 ECHR 
proportionality exercise, but instead indicated the weight to be given to certain factors. This 
‘weight interpretation’, favoured by the judges in KMO and MM (Uganda), argued that the: 
 
...statutory directions are clear that additional weight should be given in the 
proportionality exercise to qualifying children24 (as opposed to other children), 
about what level of weight must be achieved (either ‘unduly harsh’ or 
‘unreasonable’) before the imperative to remove/deport is outweighed as being 
disproportionate, and that all the public interest factors [in s117B of the NIAA] are 
weighed against the effect of removal/deportation on the child.25 
 
 More troublesome still was the Court of Appeal decision in MA (Pakistan) in which 
Elias LJ: 
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Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, s117D(1): 
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…concluded by endorsing the weight interpretation, [but] he was clear that he felt 
constrained to do so because of the preceding decision in MM (Uganda) and that 
‘free from authority, I would favour the [‘exception’] argument of the appellants.’26 
 
The lack of judicial unanimity, and the apparent absurdity of ignoring all the indications 
that s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 set up statutory exceptions to deportation or removal on 
the basis of the strength of claim to remain in the UK of the child or partner, indicated that the 
Supreme Court would have to step in to resolve this dispute. The troublesome offspring of s 19 
the Immigration Act 2014 needed disciplining. Or, as Lord Carnwath in KO (Nigeria) more 
diplomatically put it, ‘It is profoundly unsatisfactory that a set of provisions which was 
intended to provide clear guidelines to limit the scope for judicial evaluation should have led 
to such disagreement’.27 
 
2. KO (Nigeria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2018] UKSC 53 
KO (Nigeria) is particularly significant because it brought together appeals from many of the 
cases which comprised the troublesome offspring of s 19, Immigration Act 2014. The appeal 
to the Supreme Court arose from the Upper Tribunal decision in KMO28 and the Court of 
Appeal judgments in MM (Uganda)29 and MA (Pakistan).30 These cases represent the dominant 
strand – the ‘weight interpretation’ – of judicial treatment of s 19, Immigration Act 2014. Lord 
Carnwath’s judgment, with which the other Supreme Court Justices agreed, majestically cut 
through the tortured history of each case to get to the relevant central question, to the point at 
which it is impossible to paraphrase it more succinctly: 
 
The Appellants’ case, in short, is that in determining whether it is “reasonable to 
expect” a child to leave the UK with a parent (under section 117B(6)), or whether 
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the effect of deportation of the parent on the child would be “unduly harsh” (under 
section 117C(5)) the tribunal is concerned only with the position of the child, not 
with the immigration history and conduct of the parents, or any wider public interest 
factors in favour of removal. By contrast the Secretary of State argues that both 
provisions require a balancing exercise, weighing any adverse impact on the child 
against the public interest in proceeding with removal or deportation of the parent.31 
 
 The question was therefore to decide as between an ‘exception interpretation’ and 
‘weight interpretation’, and Lord Carnwath determined that s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 
creates statutory exceptions to removal and deportation. I explain in this section how he came 
to that view. In doing so, KO (Nigeria) resolves one of the core problems arising from the 
Immigration Act 2014, namely that the extant judicial interpretation of s 19, Immigration Act 
2014 had strained linguistic defensibility and introduced an unnecessary level of uncertainty 
into judicial-decision making. The second problem of s 19, Immigration Act 2014 is that the 
qualifying criteria for the exceptions to removal or deportation – ‘unreasonable’, ‘unduly 
harsh’, and ‘very compelling circumstances’ – are ill-defined and subjective. Lord Carnwath 
then had to decide whether an error of law was made in each of the cases being appealed. 
Through this process, we can potentially identify in what circumstances it appears to be 
‘unreasonable’ for a child to leave the UK, or when deportation of a parent is ‘unduly harsh’ 
on a child, and this section conducts that identification work. Although we might be able to 
deduce certain principles that emerge from Lord Carnwath’s reasoning, it falls short of being 
effective judicial guidance. 
 
Exception or Weight? 
Lord Carnwath finds three primary reasons for endorsing an ‘exception interpretation’ of s 19 
of the Immigration Act 2014; (1) the wording of the subsections, (2) the structure of the 
provisions, and (3) the purpose of consistency, predictability and transparency. 
As to the question of whether s 19 Immigration Act 2014 ought to be interpreted as 
creating exceptions or importing a requirement to weigh factors in a particular manner, Lord 
Carnwath’s first mode of reasoning based on the words used found nothing in the use of the 
terms ‘not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom’32 nor ‘the effect of 
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C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh’33 that ‘import[s] a reference to 
the conduct of the parent’ which is to be balanced against the situation of the children or 
partner.34 The statute clearly then envisages an assessment – an evaluative exercise35 – as to 
the effects of removal or deportation on a child or partner, rather than a judge-led balance 
between the seriousness of the individual’s offending or breach of immigration control, and the 
interests of children or partners. The standard that is being applied to determine individual 
cases is therefore the same within each category; those who face removal because they require 
leave to remain and do not have it, foreign national offenders sentenced to imprisonment of 
less than four years, and foreign national offenders convicted for more than four years. Within 
each category, the seriousness of the offence committed is irrelevant to the judicial task, so that 
decision-makers would not be ‘asked to decide whether consequences which are deemed 
unduly harsh for the son of an insurance fraudster may be acceptably harsh for the son of a 
drug-dealer.’36 The seriousness of offending, and thereby the relevant standard against which 
to assess the effect of the deportation, was determined in advance by Parliament and reflected 
in the increasing hurdles set for those facing removal, for deportation after a prison sentence 
of less than four years, and those who were sentenced to more than four years imprisonment. 
Secondly, the structural device of ‘free-standing’37 statutory exceptions to the 
presumption that removal or deportation is in the public interest clearly influenced the outcome 
in KO (Nigeria). Lord Carnwath acknowledged that the distinction is clearly drawn in the Act 
between the ‘general rule’ which acts as ‘preamble to the more specific rules.’38 These specific 
rules – labelled in the deportation sections (s117C NIAA) as ‘Exceptions’ – are each ‘precisely 
defined’.39 When the defined criteria of each exception are met, ‘they are enough…to remove 
the public interest in deportation.’40 In other words, meeting the criteria set out in the statutory 
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Exceptions means that the foreign national is excepted from the designation that their removal 
or deportation is in the public interest. Where there is no public interest in the act of removal 
or deportation, it should not take place. 
Less useful is the third mode of reasoning which Lord Carnwath set out at the start of his 
judgment as one of the general approaches which he would use to guide his decision.41 He 
emphasised the general purpose and context of the legislative exercise and followed the 
Supreme Court decision in Hesham Ali42 (concerning the July 2012 amendments to the 
Immigration Rules and which mirror the Immigration Act 2014) which found the government’s 
overall intention to be to ‘promote consistency, predictability and transparency’.43 The 
exception interpretation endorsed in KO (Nigeria) at least fulfils this purpose from the 
perspective of statutory interpretation. The primary problem with the alternative, weight 
interpretation was that it required the decision-maker to ignore a ‘structural device which 
appears to be clearly signposted’ in the Act,44 and to ‘contort the plain meaning of the words 
used.’45 As Elias LJ had commented in MA (Pakistan), the Act appeared to be ‘drafted in an 
extremely convoluted way to achieve so limited an aim [as that achieved by the weight 
interpretation]. The objective could have been achieved much more clearly and succinctly.’46 
I suggested previously that Parliament’s intention to create statutory exceptions to removal or 
deportation would be frustrated if the plain structure and wording were to be ignored in favour 
of the executive’s preferred, but linguistically indefensible, interpretation.47 
 However, although KO (Nigeria) presents a more consistent and transparent 
interpretation of statute, it is difficult to claim that the statutory scheme in s 19, Immigration 
Act 2014 is likely to produce consistent or predictable outcomes for individual appellants as a 
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consequence of the judgment. Decision-makers will continue to face borderline cases in which 
they have to decide whether the effect of an foreign national offenders deportation on children 
or partners is ‘unduly harsh’ or merely harsh,48 or whether the obstacles to the foreign national 
offenders reintegration in their country of nationality presents ‘very significant obstacles’ or 
merely significant obstacles.49 These standards are inherently subjective and impervious to 
comprehensive or objective definition. This is evident in the case law to date where, for 
example, the ‘unduly harsh’ effects of deportation on the child have been defined by reference 
to synonyms rather than substantive content: 
 
…“unduly harsh” does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable 
or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. “Harsh” 
in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antitheses of pleasant 
or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb “unduly” raises an already 
elevated standard still higher.50  
 
To hang the statutory exceptions to deportation on a test of ‘highly bleak’ is no more 
objectively illuminating or transparent a set of standards than the original formulation of 
‘unduly harsh’. 
 
What is ‘Reasonable’ or ‘Unduly Harsh’ for a Child? 
As observed above, the evaluative exercise required by the statutory exceptions in s 19, 
Immigration Act 2014 is inherently subjective. Assessment as to what is not reasonable for a 
child to endure, or what is unduly harsh on a child, is caught up in a wider debate about what 
the welfare or best interests of children require. If ‘the best interests of the child’ can be 
critiqued for being an ‘indeterminate and speculative’ principle,51 then the consideration of 
what is reasonable or unduly harsh on a child is more so because it requires evaluation beyond 
simply identifying which outcome from two or more potential options is best for the child.  
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A parallel debate is what level of harm to the best interests of children society is willing 
to accept as the cost of sanctioning adults; be it in sentencing policy, welfare benefits sanctions, 
or deportation and removal. Angela Davis makes the point about prisons that:  
 
On the whole, people tend to take prisons for granted. It is difficult to imagine life 
without them. At the same time, there is reluctance to face the realities hidden 
within them52 
 
The normalisation of deportation and removal53 has the same effect. It is increasingly 
difficult to imagine an immigration system without some form of removal and deportation to 
enforce it, and so the hidden realities – including that of separated families – become 
normalised. In turn they become a consequence that decision-makers and the public are 
reluctant to face. Thus the human suffering created by deportation and removal becomes banal 
and taken for granted. As Sedley LJ observed in one deportation case, ‘this family, short-lived 
as it has been, will be broken up for ever because of the appellant's bad behaviour. That is what 
deportation does.’54 
KO (Nigeria) continues this march towards the normalisation of the effects of deportation 
on families. Lord Carnwath, in reviewing the individual case of KO as part of the Supreme 
Court appeal case of KO (Nigeria), found that when deportation means that ‘a close parental 
relationship…cannot be continued’55 that is a merely ‘undesirable’ rather than ‘unduly harsh’ 
consequence.56 We are led to shrug off this consequence as being unremarkable because, after 
all, this is what deportation does. 
Simple ‘economic disadvantage’ is also found in KO (Nigeria) to not amount to an 
unduly harsh impact of deportation on children. In the case of the appellant KO, it was accepted 
that KO’s wife was able to be the main bread-winner for the family only because of KO’s role 
as the main care-giver to their children. However, the fact that the family could access welfare 
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benefits after KOs deportation was found to be relevant to deciding that KOs deportation was 
not unduly harsh on his children.57 KO (Nigeria) therefore tacitly endorsed the finding that in 
the situation of the ‘complete fracture of…family relationships’58 and where a family must 
subsist on benefits, there is ‘Nothing out of the ordinary’59 to distinguish the effects of 
deportation on the child as being unduly harsh, rather than merely (and therefore acceptably) 
harsh.60 
Future appellants would be well advised that only destitution – or at least an income 
below what is available through mainstream welfare benefits61 – appears to rise to the level of 
unduly harsh. Worth noting, however, is that the courts have appeared to consider economic 
disadvantage on the basis of absolute income levels alone. This ignores, and therefore opens 
potential space to argue, that the knock-on social effects of economic disadvantage for families 
separated by immigration enforcement are unduly harsh in some instances. A review of the 
American literature on the effects of deportation on the family of the deportee found that: 
 
Family members are often forced to take on new roles to make ends meet: the 
remaining caregiver(s) must often work longer hours, leaving little time for contact 
with children; older children often become primary caregivers of younger siblings 
and/ or must work to support the family, impacting school performance and 
retention62 
 
A similar finding was found in the UK context regarding families separated by the income 
rules on entry clearance as a spouse.63 Where reduced family income impacts children beyond 
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the proverbial tightening of belts, so as to have a knock-on effect on school performance and 
attendance because of additional home-based responsibilities, this more direct impact on a child 
might conceivably be considered unduly harsh. 
 Another appellant in KO (Nigeria) whose appeal was ultimately dismissed by the 
Supreme Court was NS. With respect to NS, the question was about when it is ‘reasonable’ to 
expect a child to leave the UK due to the removal of a parent, rather than whether the 
deportation of a foreign national offender parent is unduly harsh. Because Lord Carnwath 
dismissed the appeal, we can usefully look to NS to help determine what kind factors might 
make it unreasonable for a child to be required to leave the UK. We should presume that the 
statutory test of whether it is reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK to be a lower 
standard than that of an effect of unduly harsh. However, none of the children of NS knew of 
life outside the UK, and one of the children ‘particularly, has been in the United Kingdom for 
more than ten years and that this represents the greater part of a young life’, so that it was found 
to be in the children’s best interests to remain in the UK.64 The Immigration Judge had also 
found in the initial decision that the children could ‘adapt to Sri Lanka’ and that their parents 
would be able to ‘do well for the children in Sri Lanka just as they have in the United 
Kingdom’.65 This suggests that, firstly, the condition of reasonableness is not the same as the 
principle of best interests (a point that I return to in the next section), and secondly, that 
emotional or social ties to the UK, and lack of ties elsewhere, may not be sufficient to make 
leaving the UK unreasonable. Instead, the reasonableness of the children leaving the UK 
appears to have been determined here by the absence of some kind of material lacking in the 
country of destination. What kind of material lacking may be sufficient is not yet clear, but 
might conceivably relate to physical safety, education or health (where there are specific needs 
of the child which cannot be met in the country of destination), or significant economic 
insecurity. 
KO (Nigeria) provides much needed clarity as to how decision-makers ought to approach 
the statutory exceptions to deportation. Those facing removal or deportation will fit into one of 
three broad categories (removal, deportation having been sentenced to imprisonment of less 
than four years, and deportation after a sentence of four years or more) and the standard by 
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which the effect of their removal or deportation on a partner or child will apply uniformly 
within each category. What KO (Nigeria) does not give is any form of authoritative guidance 
as to how to distinguish between ‘unreasonable’, ‘unduly harsh’, or ‘very compelling 
circumstances’, although, one may start piecing together clues as to where at least this panel of 
the Supreme Court might draw those lines. 
 
3. Unresolved Tensions 
There remain, however, considerable unresolved tensions in the way that deportation and 
removal decisions are to be made under s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. In particular, the 
statute is not consistent with the best interests of the child. This manifests itself in three 
interrelated ways. Firstly, the principle that the child should not be blamed for the conduct of 
their parents appears inconsistent with a statutory scheme which permits a series of escalating 
negative impacts on the child which are a priori set by the severity of the misconduct of their 
parent. Secondly, the requirement to consider the impact of the child in the context of whether 
their parent(s) would have an independent leave to remain is inconsistent with the same aspect 
of the best interests of the child. Finally, the construction of the statutory hurdle of ‘reasonable’ 
(let alone ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘very compelling circumstances’) appears to be set higher than 
what is in the best interests of the child, yet there are no reasons given (or discussion engaged 
in) as to why the s 55 duty in the BCIA to the best interests of the child may be set aside in this 
case. 
 
The Best Interests of the Child: Blaming the child for matters for which he or she is not 
responsible 
At the start of his judgment, Lord Carnwath sets out the general principles by which he sought 
to be guided in making his decision. Among them that:  
 
…the presumption, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that the 
provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the 
“best interests” of children, including the principle that “a child must not be blamed 
for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent” 
(see Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74, 
[2013] 1 WLR 3690, para 10 per Lord Hodge).66 
                                                          




The courts have found consistently that s 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration 
Act 2008 (BCIA) and the case law (particularly ZH (Tanzania)67 and Zoumbas68) ‘survived’ as 
applicable principles of law after the changes wrought by the Immigration Act 2014.69 With 
respect to s 55 BCIA, Mr Justice McCloskey (then President of the Upper Tribunal) is emphatic: 
 
…in all cases where section 55 of the 2009 Act applies, the requirement to perform 
the twofold statutory duties is unaffected by the statutory reforms made by the 
Immigration Act 2014 and, in particular, the insertion of the new Part 5A into the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There has been no amendment of 
section 55 of the 2009 Act. It continues to apply with full vigour. It has not been 
modified in any way by the most recent flurry of statutory activity… Both regimes 
will have to be given full effect by the Secretary of State in appropriate cases.70 
 
Although Lord Carnwath recognises the continued applicability of s 55 BCIA, he does 
not address a fundamental conflict between the principle that the ‘child must not be blamed for 
matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent’ and a statutory 
scheme which permits a series of escalating negative impacts on the child which are a priori 
set by the severity of the misconduct of their parent. Where a parent of a child is subject to 
removal (‘A person may be removed from the United Kingdom under the authority of the 
Secretary of State or an immigration officer if the person requires leave to enter or remain in 
the United Kingdom but does not have it’)71 then it must be unreasonable to expect the child to 
leave the UK before that child meets the statutory exception72 and thus free from the prospect 
of constructive removal and/or loss of contact with one or other parent. Where the parent of a 
child has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years, or is a ‘persistent 
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offender’, then the effect on the child must be ‘unduly harsh’.73 Where the parent has been 
sentenced to four years imprisonment or more, then there must be ‘very compelling 
circumstances’74 before the best interests of the child are secured. 
The more ‘blameworthy’ the parent’s behaviour was, the greater must be the impact on 
the child before the child’s best interests can outweigh the public interest in deportation. The 
questions posed by the Immigration Act 2014 – is it unreasonable for the child to leave the UK, 
is deportation unduly harsh on the child, or are there very compelling circumstances – are 
therefore not as child-centric as Lord Carnwath suggests because they appear to require the 
child to be blamed for the conduct of their parents, in contravention of the prevailing 
interpretations of the section 55 duty which Lord Carnwath explicitly refers to as a relevant 
‘general principle’.75 
 The critique of Lord Carnwath’s decision in this respect is that he provides no further 
clarity as to what it means, as a practically useful principle of law, to not blame the child for 
the conduct of their parents in immigration decisions. To draw out this critique, we must start 
with what it means to ‘blame’ someone. To blame someone is to say that they are responsible 
for some wrong. To blame someone fairly therefore requires that they possessed the moral 
competence to be able to act in a way which avoided the blameworthy behaviour. If they were 
unable to prevent or avoid the action, they cannot be reasonably blamed for that action.76 Thus 
the child of a criminal offender cannot be said to be blameworthy of the criminal act that the 
offending parent has committed because they cannot have prevented their parent’s offending 
and could not have avoided it taking place because it was not the child’s own actions; the child 
is not responsible for the wrong (be it an immigration or criminal wrong) that causes their 
parent to face removal or deportation. Rosalind English argued that the logical consequence of 
the principle that the child should not be blamed for the conduct of their parent is that therefore 
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there can be no public interest consideration against which the best interests of the child can be 
weighed against. No balancing exercise under Article 8 ECHR remains possible: 
 
So in other words a determination that takes into account the usual principles of 
Article 8 jurisprudence amounts to a verdict on the children which “blames” them 
for their parents bad behaviour. The objection to this line of reasoning is that it 
evacuates the balancing act of any content by first taking away the usual factors by 
which we measure whether one case is deserving and the other not and then 
substituting for these measures a mechanical test – the question: “is this in the 
child’s best interests”?77 
 
 However, this runs contrary to how Lady Hale in ZH (Tanzania)78 first set out the idea 
that the child should not be blamed. Lady Hale does not set out an absolute test, as English 
supposes, that the best interests of the child will always prevail. Instead, the best interests of the 
child are still explicitly made subject to a balance: 
 
…the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that 
they must be considered first. They can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative 
effect of other considerations.79 
 
On the other hand, Laws LJ appears to go too far in the opposite direction to English. In 
reviewing the statement that the child should not be blamed for the moral failure of their parent 
he exclaimed, ‘Of course not; but that is not to say, as sometimes it is perhaps taken to say, that 
in a child case the importance of immigration control is in any way lessened.’80 However, if the 
public interest is entirely unaltered, then to say that the child is not being blamed for the parent’s 
actions becomes a mere platitude with no legal substance or consequence. This cannot be 
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correct either. It is a principle which has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in both ZH 
(Tanzania) and in Zoumbas,81 and given further authority by Lord Carnwath in KO (Nigeria).82  
In all of these cases it is presupposed by the Supreme Court Justices that it has some substantive 
legal meaning and effect, contra the implication of Laws LJ. 
This first critique of the decision in KO (Nigeria) is therefore that it leaves us none the 
wiser as to what it can rationally mean to not ‘blame’ a child for the conduct of their parents in 
immigration matters. How can one rationally reconcile the general principle that the child 
should not be blamed for the conduct of their parent’s, with the endorsement of a statutory 
schema which appears to do precisely that? Clearly the public policy side of the balance is not 
evacuated of content, as English suggested, but not to blame the child for the conduct of their 
parent appears to remain a general legal principle rather than an empty claim as implied by 
Laws LJ. The failure of KO (Nigeria) to resolve this ongoing tension – or even to acknowledge 
its existence – in UK immigration law is a missed opportunity. 
 
The Best Interests of the Child: What is relevant as the context of the decision? 
In removal decisions, the courts have struggled with whether the best interests of the child ought 
to be determined in isolation, or in the context of their parents having no independent leave to 
remain. This problem overlaps with the one described above because it emerges as a 
consequence of the principle that the child ought not to be blamed for the conduct of their 
parents in immigration decisions which affect the child. The courts have found the problem 
easier to state than to resolve. 
 On the one hand, if the sole question for determination is whether it is reasonable for 
the child to remain in the UK then only two possible futures for the child ought to be considered; 
that they remain in the UK, or are removed. Either the child’s parents will be removed as well 
or they will be granted leave to remain in order to maintain the child’s best interests (as there is 
an established principle in UK law that it is in the best interests of children to be brought up by 
their natural parents).83 Neither outcome will result in the child being separated from their 
parent, and so the question as to whether it is reasonable to require the child to leave the UK 
comes down principally to a question of which of ‘here’ or ‘there’ best supports the child’s best 
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interests. Kalverboer et al. suggest the following list of factors as relevant to the determination 
of the best interests of the child in migration procedures:  
 
 Adequate physical care 
 Safe immediate physical environment 
 Affective atmosphere  
 Supportive, flexible parenting structure  
 Adequate example set by parents 
 Interest in the child 
 Continuity in upbringing and care, future perspective 
 Safe wider physical environment 
 Respect 
 Social network 
 Education 
 Contact with peers and friends  
 Adequate examples set by the community  
 Stability in life circumstances, future perspective84 
 
To this list, one might add the quality of healthcare, and the child’s own views and 
opinions.85 
On the other hand, if the child’s best interests are first and foremost in having the care 
and protection of their parents, as UK family law presumes, then it is contextually relevant to 
the enquiry as to whether it is reasonable for the child to be removed from the UK whether or 
not the parents have their own freestanding Article 8 ECHR claim to remain in the UK, or 
whether absent the child they would be removed. Confronted with this question in PD (Sri 
Lanka), the Upper Tribunal found that: 
 
                                                          
84 Margrite Kalverboer and others, ‘The Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Migration: Assessing and 
Determining the Best Interests of the Child in Migration Procedures’ (2017) 25 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 114, 126 
 
85 Committee on the Rights of the Children, ‘General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have 
His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (Art. 3, Para. 1)’ 
<http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsqIkirKQZLK2M
58RF%2f5F0vEAXPu5AtSWvliDPBvwUDNUfn%2fyTqF7YxZy%2bkauw11KClJiE%2buI1sW0TSbyFK1Mx




In circumstances where the claims of several family members coincide, it would be 
artificial and unrealistic to determine them on their individual merits, in a rigid 
sequence and in insulated packages, without reference to the other claims.86 
 
Lord Carnwath in KO (Nigeria) comes to the same conclusion, finding that:  
 
…it seems to me inevitably relevant in both contexts to consider where the parents, 
apart from the relevant provision, are expected to be, since it will normally be 
reasonable for the child to be with them.87  
 
However, the Upper Tribunal in PD (Sri Lanka) were alive to the inherent conflict 
between this contextual approach to the question of reasonableness and the prevailing authority 
on the best interests of the child: 
 
…we must weigh the third Appellant’s best interests, as we have assessed them, 
which have the status of a primary consideration.  The main countervailing factor 
is that the first and second Appellants have no legal right to remain in the United 
Kingdom. Their immigration status is that of unlawful over-stayers.  This is a factor 
of undeniable weight.  However, it has been frequently stated that a child’s best 
interests should not be compromised on account of the misdemeanours of its 
parents.88 
 
 Lord Carnwath describes the weighing of the best interests of the child against the 
immigration misdemeanours of the parent as only ‘indirectly material’.89 But this clearly 
underplays the work that the investigation of the parent’s independent removability is doing in 
framing the decision-making process. When the question of the reasonableness of the child 
being ‘here’ or ‘there’ begins with determining whether the parents should be assumed to be 
‘here’ or ‘there’, then only if there are best interests factors which require the child to remain 
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‘here’ in the UK and which would otherwise outweigh their best interests in being brought up 
by their parents ‘there’, would it be unreasonable to expect the child to depart the UK. The 
effect is to deflect again the judicial gaze of enquiry away from the person of the child and the 
question as to whether or not it is unreasonable for them to leave the UK. The judicial gaze is 
returned instead onto a balancing between the public interest in removing the parent and the 
best interests of the child. In a context in which firm border control is the political and judicial 
mantra of the moment, it is a balance that is weighted against the child from the start. 
As well as the consequentialist objection to the approach adopted by Lord Carnwath in 
KO (Nigeria), two further objections are based in established principles. The first is that to 
balance the best interests of the child against the immigration misdemeanours of the child’s 
parents inevitably results in violation of the principle that ‘a child must not be blamed for 
matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent’.90 For this 
principle to mean anything must require that the consideration of the reasonableness of the child 
leaving the UK must not be affected by the immigration history of their parents. However, 
whether or not their parents would likely to be able to establish an independent, freestanding 
Article 8 ECHR claim to remain in the UK is intimately connected to their immigration history. 
The public interest in removal is greater, by order of statute, where the adult established their 
private life claim to remain in the UK when they were in the UK unlawfully or with only 
precarious leave to remain.91 An adult appellant against removal will therefore have a stronger 
claim to remain independently in the UK if they are free from immigration misdemeanours such 
as unlawful entry or overstaying, and have stronger claims to remain the shorter any such 
periods of presence without leave were. When the strength of the parent’s independent claim to 
leave to remain is then the contextual starting point against which the best interests of the child 
is determined, as proposed in KO (Nigeria), then the outcome of the child’s case is (at least in 
part) dependent upon whether their parent is guilty of immigration misdemeanours. As this is 
the outcome of Lord Carnwath’s decision in KO (Nigeria), it is hard to characterise as anything 
other than causing the child to be blamed for the conduct of their parent. 
This objection to the judgment in KO (Nigeria) again rests on the lack of engagement 
in the judgment with this inherent tension, rather than a presupposition that the best interests of 
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the child ought to be the sole, defining consideration. However, as outlined above, to ensure 
that a child is not blamed for the misconduct of their parent appears to be fundamentally violated 
by the approach in KO (Nigeria) to place the child’s best interests claim in the context of their 
parent’s independent claim to leave to remain. After adopting as a general principle that the 
child ought not to be blamed in this manner, it should have been incumbent on Lord Carnwath 
to explain how he reconciled in his own mind the principle and the consequences of his 
judgment when they so clearly diverge. On the other hand, if the principle that the child ought 
not to be blamed for the misconduct of their parents in immigration decisions is a merely 
rhetorical device, rather than a legal principle with substantive consequence for decision-
making, again, Lord Carnwath neither makes this distinction clear nor engages with its 
justification. It is this lack of clarity in the judgment in KO (Nigeria) that remains problematic 
for ensuring that the best interests of the child in immigration decisions is actually understood 
by the Secretary of State, and appellate decision-makers. 
The second relevant principle against which this aspect of KO (Nigeria) can be critiqued 
is that the focus on border control as the starting point of the enquiry (i.e. whether or not the 
parent should be removed as the starting point for determining the reasonableness of the child 
leaving the UK) is evidence of what Dembour describes a ‘problematic logical inversion’92 in 
the determination of the human rights of migrants. In the context of the European Court of 
Human Rights, but which appears to equally apply to the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria), 
Dembour argues that:  
 
…the Court conceives of the rights guaranteed in the Convention as exceptions 
which temper the general principle of state sovereignty regarding migration 
control, rather than the Court conceiving the state control prerogative as tempering 
human rights norms…93 
 
 The insistence of Lord Carnwath in KO (Nigeria) to contextualise the reasonableness of 
the child leaving the UK means that the initial decision-making focus remains on the parents 
and the migration control agenda. Only if the child’s best interests in remaining ‘here’ outweigh 
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to go with their parents ‘there’ is the principle of state sovereignty over migration control 
tempered by the human rights of the child.  
In contrast, what is implied to be a de-contextualised approach which focusses on the 
child, and the child alone, is anything but. To determine whether it is reasonable for the child 
to leave the UK by reference only to the child’s best interests is highly contextual as (following 
the best interests checklist from Kalverboer et al.)94 it should be based in the child’s experiences 
of ‘here’ and ‘there’. It is not a de-contextualised approach, rather it is one which is concerned 
principally with the child’s context, and not the context of the state’s immigration control 
agenda. What an approach based solely on the child’s experiences of deportation does not do is 
make the child’s best interests a secondary consideration which must overcome the state’s 
interests in migration control. It is this change of perspective – to reverse the problematic logical 
inversion – which the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) appears to be struggling to reconcile 
itself to as a necessary condition of giving full effect to the best interests of the child. 
I have argued here that this failure to reconcile itself fully to a truly child-first-and-only 
interpretation of s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 means that the child’s best interests remain 
subject to determination, in a way that is more direct than is appreciated by the Supreme Court, 
with reference to the immigration misdemeanours of their parents. This means that the balance 
remains set against the child in the determination of whether it is reasonable for them to leave 
the UK, and that they are still being blamed for the (mis)conduct of their parents. 
 
The Best Interests of the Child v Reasonableness 
This final point is intimately connected to the others. If the s 55 BCIA duty applies to 
deportation and removal decisions, and if the s 55 BCIA duty requires the courts to be concerned 
with the best interests of children – both points which Lord Carnwath accepts as relevant 
‘general principles’95 – then what is the difference between the ‘best interests of the child’ and 
‘reasonableness’? From KO (Nigeria) it appears that it is reasonable for a child to leave the UK, 
even when that is not in the best interests of that child. In deciding the appeal of NS, Lord 
Carnwath finds that the children’s:  
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…best interests would have been for the whole family to remain here. But in a 
context where the parents had to leave, the natural expectation would be that the 
children would go with them, and there was nothing in the evidence reviewed by 
the judge to suggest that that would be other than reasonable.96 
 
The effect of requiring the decision to consider whether it is reasonable to expect the child 
to leave the UK in the context of the disposal of the parent’s case is clearly stark. When the 
assessment is on the child’s situation alone, it is not reasonable for the child to leave the UK. 
However, when the assessment is taken against a background which assumes the parents will 
be removed, the outcome as to what is reasonable for the child substantively alters. 
Lord Carnwath at no point engages with the question as to why the s 55 duty to promote 
and safeguard the child’s welfare may be put aside so as to produce an outcome which, even if 
believed to be ‘reasonable’, is not in the child’s best interests. Recall that the children’s best 
interests in NS in remaining in the UK were not based simply on the fact that their parents were 
here, but because none of the children knew of life outside the UK, and that one of the children 
had been in the UK for over ten years at a stage of adolescent development which the court had 
found particularly important for their future development, especially in being able to 
successfully establish their own private and family life as a young adult.97 The failure to present 
reasons for this departure from the principle of best interests is a new tension which is 
unnecessarily introduced by KO (Nigeria). 
 This judgment also appears to further widen the gulf between the protection of the best 
interests of British and EEA-national children on one hand, and non-EEA-national children on 
the other. Although Sanade98 may no longer provide a blanket presumption that it is 
unreasonable to require a British or EEA-national child to leave the EU,99 a higher level of 
protection for their best interests persists as not all foreign national offender parents can 
possibly constitute ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of 
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public policy or of public security’,100 so as to permit the public interest in deportation to 
outweigh the principle of EU law at stake. The best interests of British and EEA-national 
children remain more valuable than the best interests of non-EEA-national children in removal 
and deportation decisions. 
 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) have intervened to discipline the troublesome offspring of 
s 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. The judgment confirms that the dominant strand of 
interpretation at the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal is incorrect, namely that s 19 does not 
simply put Parliament’s thumb on the balancing scale in removal and deportation decisions. 
Instead the Supreme Court have found that it was Parliament’s intention to create free-standing, 
statutory exceptions to removal and deportation, indicated by its deliberate use of words and 
structural devices. 
 This makes UK removal and deportation easier to understand. Three categories are 
created on the basis of the reason for removal or deportation; removal for lack of leave to enter 
or remain (s 117B(6) NIAA), deportation having been sentenced to a period of imprisonment 
of less than four years or is a persistent offender (s 117C(3)-(5) NIAA), or deportation as a 
consequence of imprisonment of four years or more (s 117C (6) NIAA). Within each category, 
the assessment as to what is ‘reasonable’, ‘unduly harsh’, or amounts to ‘very compelling 
circumstances’ in order to meet the requirements of the exception is the same across the 
category to which it relates. The focus of the assessment is therefore solely on the person of the 
qualifying partner or child, and the relative strength of the public interest within the categories 
are not directly relevant to the determination. 
 This has the virtue of clarity, and of ostensibly being a child-centric determination. 
However, it leaves a number of tensions remaining within UK law, principally around the 
application of the best interests of the child through s 55 BCIA. Although Lord Carnwath in 
KO (Nigeria) acknowledges the importance of not blaming the child for the misconduct of their 
parent in immigration decisions as a fundamental aspect of the best interests of the child, the 
creation of an escalating set of provisions where the negative effects on the child must increase 
in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct of the parent (albeit in broad categories rather 
than in direct proportion), seems to violate this principle. Secondly, the conduct of the parent is 
constructed as indirectly relevant to the consideration of what is ‘reasonable’ for the child to 
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endure as a consequence of the removal of parent(s) because the decision as to the child’s future 
is framed in the context of the removability of the parents. Lastly, the standard of ‘reasonable’ 
is set at a level above that of the best interests of the child, but with no critical engagement or 
explanation as to why this might be. 
 Although KO (Nigeria) is a victory for the plain reading of Parliament’s intention 
through statute, and a defeat of the executive’s hope to effectively re-write primary legislation 
through litigation, the statute itself remains considerably problematic. 
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